Bureaucracy, "domesticated" elites, and the abolition of capital punishment: processes of state-formation and the number of executions in England and Habsburg Austria between 1700 and 1914 by Reicher, Dieter
www.ssoar.info
Bureaucracy, "domesticated" elites, and the
abolition of capital punishment: processes of state-
formation and the number of executions in England
and Habsburg Austria between 1700 and 1914
Reicher, Dieter
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Reicher, D. (2010). Bureaucracy, "domesticated" elites, and the abolition of capital punishment: processes of state-
formation and the number of executions in England and Habsburg Austria between 1700 and 1914. Crime, Law and
Social Change, 54(3-4), 279-297. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-010-9258-1
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-277217
  
1 
Bureaucracy, “domesticated” elites, and the abolition of capital punishment. Processes of 
state-formation and the number of executions in England and Habsburg Austria between 
1700 and 1914. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The paper argues that rise and decline of capital punishment correlate with long-term 
processes of state formation. In particular, it stresses that with the introduction of a modern 
bureaucratic apparatus, the death penalty lost importance for the regime of punishment. 
The study is based on two empirical sources: 1) an analysis of the numbers of executions and 
death sentences in England and in Austria from the eighteenth century to the outbreak of 
World War I; and 2) English and Austrian pamphlet literature and philosophical treatises on 
the death penalty in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
Part 2 of the paper discusses the most important theories concerning the role of capital 
punishment. It will be shown that the theory of civilizing processes is of particular relevance 
for understanding the relationship between state-building processes and the decline of cruel 
forms of punishment. 
Part 3 presents a comparison of Austrian and English judicial records. These records provide 
information about the numbers of executions, the numbers of death sentences and the 
structure of offences for which capital punishment was imposed. This analysis demonstrates 
that, as of the second half of the eighteenth century, the death penalty was used much less 
frequently Austria than in England. This evidence prompts reconsideration of some 
sociological explanations about the rise and the fall of public executions and the death 
penalty in general. 
Part 4 of the paper focuses on processes of state-formation in both countries. It shows: 1) how 
institutions of social control differed in the two countries; and 2) how the state-building 
process in Austria was conducive to reforming the regime of punishment. 
Part 5 of the paper presents qualitative analyses of pamphlet literature and philosophical 
arguments. These help to understand attitudes, affects and emotions related to the death 
penalty. This analytical approach makes it clear that the main responsibility for a reduction in 
the use of capital punishment lay with protagonists in high administrative positions of the 
Habsburg Empire. Their disapproval of capital punishment, as well as the political interests 
of the absolutistic state, served to weaken local elites. In England, the power figuration was 
different and therefore bureaucratic institutions did not play the same dominant role. This 
study demonstrates that capital punishment was a key instrument for the English elites to 
defend their political and economic privileges. 
 
2. Some theoretical approaches to explain rise and fall of capital punishment  
 
Many sociological explanations do not investigate connections between the behavior of the 
administrative apparatus and changes in the regime of punishment. They are more concerned 
with the interplay between economic transformations and their influence on social control 
and punishment (Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939, Melossi and Pavarini 1981, Hay et.al. 1977, 
Thompson 1975, Polanyi 2001). These authors generally consider state-building processes to 
be marginal phenomena driven by economic developments. These arguments are summarized 
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under the concept of the “political economy of punishment” (Garland 1990: 83-110). Some 
theorists – including, to a certain extent, Foucault (1975) see modern justice systems 
reductionistically, as a device to control the lower classes. Most of these theories focus only 
on certain single case studies, such as Rusche and Kirchheimer (and Marx) on the English or 
Foucault on the French case (the exception being Melossi and Pavarini who did an 
international comparison of prison systems). Subsequently, some of these authors have 
neglected the idiosyncratic character of sociological investigation because they only focus on 
a single state-society (Weber 1988). 
Other theoretical perspectives are more concerned with processes of power formation and 
their correlation to the regime of punishment; Savelsberg (1999) focuses on the organization 
of domination and knowledge, while Durkheim stresses the importance of the evolution of 
institutions and its relationship to the collective conscience (Durkheim 1899/1900: 65-77, 
Durkheim 1984, 2001, Spitzer 1975). Durkheim suggests studying changes in the regime of 
punishments within a process of democratization in which the degree of brutality of 
punishment decreases. 
However, it seems that the theory of civilizing processes develops the clearest understanding 
how the monopolization of a state‟s power impacts the regime of criminal punishment. On 
the basis of the Dutch experience, Spierenburg (1984) observed that in the period between the 
end of the Middle Ages and the second half of the nineteenth century, the use of the death 
penalty changed dramatically. He formulated three phases of transformation (Spierenburg 
1984: 202 – 205). In the first phase, the early modern state sought to assert itself. State 
authorities attempted to monopolize power and to suppress all alternative forms of private 
violence. Torture and public executions were the means of demonstrating the state‟s new 
power. The early modern states, however, still operated under fairly unstable conditions, and 
their power institutions were relatively weak. In the second phase, the state‟s position was 
more assured, because a mighty power-center developed. During this period, the aristocracy 
no longer lived under feudal conditions and, thus, no longer had a fundamental military 
function. The nobility developed a refined life-style and, along with the high bourgeoisie, 
they were “domesticated” and “pacified”. The living conditions of these “domesticated” elites 
became more elaborate and cultivated. Spierenburg argues that these two elite groups began 
to rebel against the bloody rituals of punishment first. Their aversion to violence was a result 
of a process of conscience formation. Their disgust changed into pity. Spierenburg believes 
that many of these elites entered a “new stage and identified to a certain degree with the 
convicts on the scaffold” (Spierenburg 1984: 204). In this period, also the torture 
disappeared. In the third phase, the nation-state was formed. It expanded the capacity for 
empathy to a wider spectrum, because more social groups were integrated and could 
participate in power decisions (democratization). Increasingly, democratized power 
relationships accelerated the moderation of the penal code. Citizens of different social ranks, 
too, began to identify with each other and with the suffering of the offender on the scaffold. 
Public executions – and later, executions in general – came to be seen as a source of national 
shame, and were therefore abolished (see also Evans 1996, Gatrell 1996 with their national 
focuses on Germany and England). Thus, Spierenburg argues, harsh punishments (like public 
executions) were the result of wide class differences that caused social and emotional 
distance. This promoted the unwillingness or impossibility of identification with the destiny 
of individuals of different (lower) social background. This lack of empathy ultimately caused 
a lack pity for the culprits on the scaffold.  
The theory of civilizing processes demonstrates the importance of three dimensions for the 
analysis: First, long-term state building-processes are not necessarily economic 
epiphenomena. They are essential to understanding institutions and organizations of crime 
control and correction. Second, the evolution of mentality or what is called the habitus (Elias 
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1982&1996, Bourdieu 1989, Wacquant 1990) – as a kind of bodily imprinting of collective 
long-term experiences – is useful for explaining the role of emotions like pity for criminal 
offenders). Third, owing to the process of democratization, civilizing standards were 
extended down the ladder of social hierarchy. The existence of a feeling of national unity 
seems to support the idea of a downward progression of civilizing standards. Therefore, in the 
context of this theory, one would most expect the abolition of brutal punishments in 
democratic nation-states. In democratic societies, citizens more easily identify with the pain 
of an offender on the scaffold. Thus, they are more likely to avoid public executions – and to 
eschew capital punishment in general. Some critics of this theory maintain that it is still 
unclear how empathy and non-violent attitudes spread downward through the social hierarchy 
from domesticated elites to the rest of the population (Braithwaite 1993). 
Another problematic factor is that Spierenburg‟s work is based on a single case study. This 
paper shows that the case of the Habsburg Empire does not fit into his patterns of 
explanation. The Austrian case is quite different from the Dutch or the English experience. 
The criminal laws of the Habsburg Monarchy were comparatively lenient, despite the fact 
that it was far from being a democratic nation state, and displayed relatively slow economic 
development. Under Empress Maria Theresia and the Emperor Joseph II, very progressive 
reforms were made in the penal system. These reforms included the early introduction of a 
penitentiary system (Melossi and Pavarini 1981: 71ff), a modern penal code, and a 
centralized police force. The Habsburg monarchy was also one of the first states to abolish 
death penalty in the 1780s (although it was reintroduced later, to a greatly reduced extent). 
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England, on the other hand, had established a 
parliamentary system which evolved (slowly) into a democracy, and the nation exhibited the 
most advanced economy of its period. 
The theory of civilizing processes would suggest that the death penalty would be less 
prevalent in England than in backward, despotic Austria – yet this was not the case. No other 
Western European country witnessed such frequent executions as England between 1700 and 
1830, a time period during which even many property offences were punished with death. Its 
penal code was old-fashioned and a modern police force was introduced only at a 
comparatively late stage. These facts must have some relevance for sociological theories of 
punishment. They could lend themselves to a Marxian argument focusing only on capitalism 
and treating state organizations as marginal phenomena. However, the argument made here 
puts the state- building process in the center. This study compares the development of death 
penalty in England and in the Austrian Monarchy firstly because these two cases seem to 
challenge both sociological theories. Furthermore, these cases also help to modify the 
Elias/Spierenburg theory by revising its themes, in particular the absolutism/democratization-
pity nexus, and the role of “domestic elites”. Moreover, both cases represent two extreme 
poles in the handling of state punishment: relatively lenient and harsh. The study also 
provides a comparative and deeper focus on the two cases. Therefore, it enables one to 
understand (Weber) certain qualities of the state machinery and subsequently to explain their 
effects on the regime of punishment. The study highlights two different “cultures of control” 
(Garland 2001) but also long-term processes of state formation that strongly influenced these 
cultures. 
 
3. Numbers of executions and numbers of death sentences in both countries
1
 
 
3.1 Death sentences and executions in England 
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Before continuing with sociological theory, I will describe the two historical case studies: 
England and Habsburg Austria from 1700 to the start of World War I. Tables 1 and 2 show 
clearly that until the middle of the nineteenth century, death sentences and executions were 
more common in England than in Austria. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, both 
death sentences and executions were much more common in England than in Austria. 
Statistical data available for eighteenth century London and Middlesex also indicate bloody 
penal practices (Gatrell 1996: 616; Reicher 2003: 42).
2
 These data reveal a steady increase in 
both the number of executions and the number of death sentences, starting with the last 
decades of the eighteenth century. The numbers peak in the decade after the Napoleonic 
Wars. Quite similar patterns can be revealed for all of England and Wales. After the 1830‟s, 
the numbers of executions and death sentences started to decline, even dipping under the 
Austrian level, which was much lower for most of the period under study. In England only a 
small fraction of those who were sentenced to death were hanged. Many condemned convicts 
were transported to the colonies, which – in many cases – was also fatal. Thus, the English 
death penalty was part of a larger penal framework that, along with actual executions, 
included forms of forced labor in the hostile environment of the colonies.  
The legal regulation of the death penalty in England changed dramatically in the period 
between 1700 and 1800. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, just a few crimes were 
punished by death. At the end of the century, there were more than 200 capital crimes 
(Radzinowics 1948: 3f, Briggs et al. 1996: 73). Most of the new capital crimes were offences 
against private property. (For more on the expansion of death penalty during this period, see 
Thompson 1975, Hay 1977, Gatrell 1996, and Evans 1996). Table 3 shows the important role 
that offences against private property played in the English penal law. It was not until the 
1830‟s that the system of penal law began to change and gradually the death penalty was 
abolished for property offences. However, in the period between 1822 and 1855, only 5 
percent of all 17420(!) death sentences in England were imposed for murder – as against 87 
percent for offences against private property. Of these last, the vast majority of death 
sentences were related to nonviolent property crimes. 
 
3.2 Death sentences and executions in Habsburg Austria 
 
In seventeenth-century Austria, penal practices were perhaps even crueler than in England. 
Beside hangings there were many other types of executions (although these were rarely used). 
However, executions became rare phenomena in eighteenth century Austria, and it seems 
they were never imposed for property crimes alone (see e.g. the collection of death penalty 
announcements published in Vienna).
3
 Empress Maria Theresia introduced in the year 1768 a 
new penal code (the “Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana”) which still officially contained 
numerous brutal penalties such as torture and severe methods of execution (Foregger 1993). 
However, this new code also marked the beginning of a phase of lasting reforms. In the 
1780s, only two decades later, Emperor Joseph II launched major reforms. A new penal code 
was introduced for some provinces. Most importantly, capital punishment was abolished for 
all crimes. In some provinces separate reforms were undertaken. The most remarkable and 
significant of these were the reforms in the 1760s in Tuscany, which introduced a very lenient 
penal system virtually devoid of capital punishment. In his journey through Tuscany, the 
English prison reformer Howard counted only 2 executions in 10 years (Melossi and Pavarini 
1981: 74f). Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo, the later Emperor Leopold II, headed this reform 
movement (which initiated what were known as the Leopoldian reforms) which included 
figures such as Pietro Verri, Paul Frisi, Cesare Beccaria and others. This group of 
intellectuals and civil servants from Milan were known as the Caffé. They were tightly 
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connected to Viennese circles representing the highest ranks of bureaucrats, such as Counts 
Kaunitz and Firmian, or enlightened reformers like Josef von Sonnenfels (the author of a 
famous treatise on the abolition of the torture). 
In Austria, capital punishment was embedded in a larger framework of other punishments 
that developed during the eighteenth century. The oldest and most brutal substitute for 
executions was forced labor on Venetian galleys. Joseph II introduced the punishment of 
pulling ships upriver on the Danube as a penalty for severe offenders. The most important 
development, however, was the introduction of a penitentiary system in eighteenth century 
which provided an alternative for the death penalty; some early prisons included the Maison 
de Force in Ghent, or the Plazzo degli Otto and the Stinche in Florence. 
During the Napoleonic threat, capital punishment was reintroduced. Its implementation, 
however, remained at a low level. It was imposed only for murder, offences against the 
state‟s authority, and in some cases, for financial fraud in relation to issued stocks (which was 
considered a threat to the state because it could have endangered the weak economy of early 
nineteenth century Austria). Beccaria and other reformers held the protection of the state as 
their highest value. For them, the state was the foundation for protecting all other values. 
Therefore, in the period between 1822 and 1855, eight percent of all Austrian death sentences 
(984) were imposed for offences against the state‟s authorities (Table 3), which was more 
than in England. However, the vast majority of all death sentences (77 percent) were related 
to murder. Only a relatively small number were imposed for offences against private 
property. 
 
Table 1: Death sentences per year and 100,000 inhabitants4 
 
Table 2: Executions per year and 100,000 inhabitants5 
 
Table 3: Death sentences and offences against private property (1822 – 1855)6 
 
Period England Austria
1805-1824 0,71 0,06
1825-1844 0,24 0,06
1845-1864 0,06 0,03
1865-1884 0,06 0,04
1885-1904 0,06 0,01
 
Period England Austria
1805-1824 6,65 0,17
1825-1844 4,70 0,19
1845-1864 0,28 0,29
1865-1884 0,43 1,40
1885-1904 0,09 0,30
 
  
abs. 
Offences  
against  
persons 
Offences  
against privat  
property with  
violence 
Offences  
against  
private  
property  
without  
violence 
Offences  
against the  
state's  
authorities 
Murder other  
Offences Total 
England 5 17 71 2 3 2 17420 
Austria 2 0 13 8 77 0 984 
 
in percent (rounded) 
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4. Weak and strong states 
 
The focus on the Habsburg Empire reveals that bureaucracy was the most important 
institution for uniting a realm that consisted of many divergent provinces. Traditionally, 
many of these territories – spreading from Italy to Belgium and from the Rhine to the today‟s 
Ukraine – did not have much in common. They differed in their political histories as well as 
in their cultures. In such a situation, the administrative apparatus with its homogeneous staff 
helped the Viennese power-center, along with its army, to rule over local elites. These local 
elites stubbornly defended their particular privileges. In many corners of the realm, particular 
traditional hierarchical systems of ethnic and social dominance prevailed, and the Emperor‟s 
power varied throughout his provinces. He was more influential in some areas than in other 
parts of his realm. As late as 1848, the aristocracy was under the rule of a separate 
jurisdiction. In particular, the wealthy high aristocracy could not be taxed successfully. 
Throughout its entire history, the Habsburg Empire neither developed into a single 
administrative and jurisdictional unit nor did it form a single economic market. It was also far 
from being a nation-state. This diversity laid down the foundation of the Austrian-Hungarian 
Monarchy (Doppelmonarchie) in 1867 and thereafter. 
The permanent struggle of the Viennese center to overcome this diversity was a typical 
characteristic of the Habsburg Empire. In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, ministries (and their forerunner organizations), local registrar offices, state court 
systems, police stations, and other offices began to eclipse provincial parliaments and local 
forms of feudal domination. In Austria, unlike in England, the power game between 
aristocracy and an absolutist monarch veered slowly in favor of the latter – without, however, 
ending in a fully centralized state such as France. Austria turned into an Empire consisting of 
many heterogeneous provinces and ethnic groups and did not develop into a nation-state 
(which was a barrier for the development of the mutual identification posited by 
Spierenburg). Aside from the army, the administrative machinery was the most important 
instrument for governing the realm. A bureaucratic elite began to intervene in all sorts of 
local affairs – which included matters of criminal justice and crime control. Thus, the 
Austrian Empire came closer to Max Weber‟s (1978) type of “bureaucratic domination” than 
any other Western European state. It cleared a path for the development of modern 
bureaucracy with its characteristic separation of economic and political/administrative power. 
In this sense, the Habsburg Monarchy was a strong state. 
To speak about weak and strong states implies multidimensional concepts. On the one hand, 
weakness can refer to a state‟s military competence. Strong states, in this sense, must have 
powerful armies and efficient tax systems (which the Habsburg Monarchy did not have). On 
the other hand, weakness or strength can be linked to the state‟s ability to cope with internal 
affairs. There are many reasons why states can be weak in their internal affairs, but strong 
militarily (such as England). Ruling elites may fear the power of a well-organized police 
(because they might become a state within the state) and thus tolerate a high crime rate. Such 
states may be unable to fight crime successfully because, for various reasons, they lack the 
resources to do so. States may be strong internally because they deploy either armed forces or 
powerful police organizations to prevent, repress, or detect crime (“policing power”). 
Secondly, states may make use of social welfare programs to deal with poverty and matters of 
distribution (“welfare power”). This also may have effects on the regime of crime control and 
crime treatment, since a class of technocrats produced by the welfare expansion may expand 
its interests into fields of penal correction and criminology (Garland 1985). Thirdly, a state 
finally may have a greater or lesser belief that its rule is just and legitimate (“ideological 
power”). These capacities may coexist in various and idiosyncratic patterns of relationships 
in every society. All these aspects are reflections of different sorts of social power (Mann 
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1986). Although more complex patterns are possible, for the purposes of this paper, I split 
Mann‟s category of military power into two parts: external and internal control (policing 
power).
 
 
This paper focuses on the internal weaknesses and strengths because of their relevance to the 
authorities‟ belief in their ability to maintain social control. Thus, “strong” refers to the 
bureaucracy as an internally powerful actor intervening in many spheres of life. Although its 
proponents may believe in its efficiency, this does not mean that a strong state is necessarily 
truly efficient. The Austrian bureaucracy was known for being hesitant and slow to react. 
However, the rule of the administrative machinery (which is the actual meaning of bureau-
cracy) organized patterns of relationships between the rulers and the ruled population in a 
totally new way. It differed from a weak-state structure, which is characterized by direct and 
personal forms of domination. Administrative rule is more distanced than personal rule. 
Bureaucracy is a form of domination characterized by its indirectness. In theory, it does not 
involve anything other than professional interests. Above all – because of its impersonal 
character – bureaucracy is open for new reform projects (sometimes utopian, sometimes 
realistic). 
 
5. Structures of state-building: democratization and bureaucracy 
 
Within the theory of civilizing processes, two lines of argumentation explain the process of 
de-brutalizating (civilizing) the regime of criminal punishment: the democratization argument 
and the bureaucracy argument. Spierenburg (1984) and De Swaan (1995 and 1997) stress the 
importance of “democratization” for civilizing violent attitudes and brutal punishments 
(democratization argument). They believe that through a process of “functional 
democratization,” the expansion of mutual identification and empathy is promoted. However, 
within in the framework of the theory of civilizing processes, an alternative explanation for 
the de-brutalization process of the regime of punishment seems possible. Elias (1982) stresses 
the argument that in France, after power was monopolized in the hands of the king an 
administrative apparatus appeared. Elias ends his history of the French civilizing process with 
the establishment of the royal court. Thus, he does not say much about what happens 
afterwards. In particular, he does not address the “second civilizing process” which started 
within the newly founded bureaucracy, and whose protagonists were no longer the nobility, 
but rather an administrative staff. Yet, it is essential to understand the development of the 
administrative machinery to see its impact on this “second civilizing process”. The 
bureaucracy argument claims that a strong and self-confident bureaucracy will very likely 
find alternatives to brutal punishment. They prefer to use modest but permanent repression to 
maintain social control. The administrative machinery facilitates professionalism, which 
helps it withstand the economic interests of capitalism and form a new kind of “domestic 
elite”. 
When studying the state-building process within the framework of the civilizing process 
theory, it is important to acknowledge the idiosyncratic characteristics of each state‟s 
development. Neither the Austrian nor the English development resembles Spierenburg‟s 
subject (the Netherlands) or Elias‟s subject (France). 
 
5.1 Patterns of state-building in England 
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The Marxian argument about punishment applies well to eighteenth century England. Not 
until the Glorious Revolution did the English gentry gain control over political and legal 
institutions. The gentry began to change laws and property rights to serve their own interests. 
They combined economic and political power and, thus, decreed capital punishment for many 
sorts of offences against private property (see Thompson 1975). 
In England, political and economic power seemed to go hand in hand. However, beginning in 
the middle of the 1830s, England witnessed political reforms such as new suffrage laws and 
the introduction of police forces. Before these reforms, the political system was a kind of 
oligarchy ruled by a powerful land-owning class (the higher nobility and the gentry). The 
proto-democratic structure of the English political system promoted the death penalty 
because it linked economic and political interests (as expressed in the high numbers of capital 
sentences for offences against private property). After the 1830s, the political system was 
opened up to lower ranks of society. This process of democratization was possible because 
England, unlike Austria, was a nation-state governed by only one parliament. Here, 
democratization was intertwined with the process of nation-state building. 
England‟s development in the eighteenth century is surprising, in a certain way. The country 
became centralized much earlier than most other European countries. The Tudors undertook 
serious attempts to install a powerful bureaucratic apparatus. The rise of the landowning 
class‟s power in the seventeenth century, however, blocked further tendencies towards 
bureaucratization. After coming to power in the year 1689, the English landowning class 
resisted attempts to establish strong central organizations such as a police force or a multi-
layer court system. Many of the state‟s internal affairs remained in the hands of the local 
elites and communities. Other tasks that were still in the hands of the state‟s bureaucracy 
were “re-localized” (for instance, the abolishing of the famous “Star Chamber”). The English 
land-owning class feared the power of any central organization. It saw powerful 
bureaucracies as a threat to its liberties. 
Since medieval times, the English court system – unlike many systems in continental states – 
had been centralized and its rules standardized (see Radzinowicz 1948, Beattie 1986). After 
the Glorious Revolution, however, only the local jury courts remained. All higher courts were 
abolished. The remaining local courts, therefore, became the centers of the legal system. In 
the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century, there was no court of appeals. 
Death sentences were reviewed by the Home Office, and no other institutions existed to 
review the local courts. 
The institutions of public social control were restricted to local elite‟s influence, too. Thus, 
Justices of the Peace – an honorary function – were often regarded as clients of the local 
elites. Edmund Burke, for example, described the JP‟s as “elderly, greedy, corrupt [men], 
who had attained office by improper means.” (Skyrme 1994: 410). Eighteenth century 
London experienced some organizations that formed a kind of police, e.g., the “Bow Street 
Runners”, but these organizations were exceptions (Emsley 1996). For the most part, public 
social work remained the task of volunteers. It was obvious to many that this system allowed 
only for low-intensity repression and social control to be deployed. However, it was not 
changed because of the gentry feared of becoming dependent on these police organizations. 
Therefore, measures of deterrence, especially public hangings, became an important 
instrument in fighting crime. The fact that the death penalty also became the major 
punishment for crimes other than murder may be an expression of the helplessness of the 
English elites in dealing with crime. Many sorts of crimes against private property became 
punishable by death. Simultaneously, Austria was taking very different steps. 
 
5.2 Patterns of state-building in Austria 
  
9 
 
Unlike in England, Austrian agricultural structure was dominated by patrimonial 
relationships (see: Kuzmics and Axtmann 2007). Big landowners and powerful peasants were 
bound by strong obligations to their petty peasantry and farm workers. This circumstance 
prevented the development of commercialization and the rise of an English-type enclosure 
movement. The central state administration eagerly tried to narrow the elbowroom of local 
big landowners, as well. The Habsburgs feared a well organized Gentry. The big landowners 
were not able to alter property rights in order to subdivide common land among individual 
owners like in England (Polanyi 2001) because they had no easy access to the law-making 
process. Both the tight patron-client relationship and the central state intervention established 
a complicated and indirect system of social control in Austria. Thus, the two fields of 
economy and politics were separated in many aspects. Already in the course of the 
seventeenth century, the organized power of the nobility (in parliaments) and the land 
owning-class was broken up by the monarch and his administration. Unlike its English peers, 
the Austrian nobility was not able to abolish their small provincial parliaments and to form a 
common parliament that would oppose the Emperor. Democratization in Austria, therefore, 
did not take place before the early 1890s. 
The Austrian monarchy, on the other hand, developed into a state with a powerful 
bureaucracy. There was a four-layer court system that had been established in the eighteenth 
century. Each layer functioned as an appeal court for the layer below. Inquisitional courts 
based on secrecy that allowed no public access replaced old jury courts. Judges were civil 
servants and mostly did not have any land-owning origins (Reicher 2003: 127ff), unlike their 
English counterparts who were recruited from the Gentry up until the end of the nineteenth 
century (Duman 1975). The legal system in Austria changed systematically so that the 
ancient common laws of the regions were eventually replaced by a unified penal code. This 
replacement mainly had the function of reducing the influence of local elites, as Max Weber 
has described (Weber 1978: 858f). 
Policing in Austria changed dramatically toward the end of the eighteenth century. A 
powerful central police organization began to replace older forms of locally run police forces 
(Gebhardt 1992). In the early days, the police carried out a multitude of tasks.
7
 In the 1780s a 
centrally governed police organization was introduced. The police in the provinces came 
directly under the control of the Viennese headquarters. Unlike in the case of the later English 
Bobbies, Austrian authorities attempted to minimize local influence on the police (no local 
participation). Even the governors of each province – who were directly nominated by the 
Emperor – did not have any official influence on the provincial police organization. Most 
importantly, a well-organized secret police was established in the 1780s and 1790s. In the 
1850s, an additional police-organization was introduced in Austria, called the 
“Gendarmerie”, which was a kind of paramilitary force designed for controlling crime in the 
countryside. 
 
6. The civilizing process of English and Austrian political elites   
 
The preliminary results lead one to reconsider the role of “domesticated” elites in eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. The English case may follow the patterns of Spierenburg‟s study on 
the Netherlands in some respects (although some noteworthy differences exist as well). 
For the English case, pamphlet literature was qualitatively analyzed in order to understand 
motives and emotions of some protagonists. In the parliamentarian culture of eighteenth-
century England, these pamphlets were intended to influence the public opinion of those who 
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had the right to vote. Thus, the pamphlets provide insight on opinions and emotions of the 
English upper classes and upper-middle classes related to the issue of the death penalty. 
For the Austrian case, no such pamphlet literature exists, owing to Austria‟s absolutist 
political structure. The opinion of political elites in the Habsburg Empire was formed 
differently. It was mainly the “enlightened” literature that discussed matters of politics and 
policing. One example is the work of Joseph von Sonnenfels and especially his treatise 
against torture. This study, however, only concentrates on the work of Cesare Beccaria, and 
its influence on the administrative elites of the realm. 
In reviewing these sources, two main characteristics become obvious. In the English 
pamphlet literature, an emotionally distanced attitude prevails towards the lower classes 
(from which most of the offenders derived). This style of writing is referred to here as 
“Machiavellian”. Quite contrary to the English pamphlet literature, Beccaria‟s writings often 
deal with the pain and suffering of offenders on the scaffold. However, his empathy is like 
that of a father for pain suffered by his children. Beccaria‟s perspective is not democratic, but 
from above looking downwards. It resembles the structure of a paternalistic and hierarchical 
society in which the state and its protagonists lead the citizens (like fathers their children or 
shepherds their sheep). Therefore, this authorial attitude is referred to here as “paternalistic”. 
 
6.1 Machiavellian attitudes of eighteenth and early nineteenth century English upper classes  
 
Eighteenth century English pamphlets only rarely give hints of pity and empathy towards the 
criminals. The content of these pamphlets expresses emotional distance and cold-blooded 
thinking. Most of the authors were in favor of the death penalty and even of public 
executions. However, they were neither blind agitators nor fanatics seeking bloody revenge; 
they were well aware of the pros and cons of public execution, and discussed them openly. 
They discuss matters of public executions like any other political topic. Examples of this kind 
of writing are A. Baldwin‟s “Hanging not punishment enough for Murtherers …” (1701), 
Mandville‟s “An Enquiry into the Cases of the frequent Executions at Tyburn” (1725), and 
Henry Fielding‟s “Murders. True Examples of the Imposition of Providences, in the 
Discovery of Punishment of Murder” (1752). These authors shared some common themes. 
These were mainly technical – i.e. not moral – problems related to the implementation of the 
death penalty. They recommended executing fewer people in the future, but not because they 
felt pity towards the convicts, or they thought it unjust or morally problematic to kill 
someone. They were more concerned about the deflationary effect of excessive executions. 
They worried that the many public execution events would diminish the intended purpose of 
deterrence. For them public executions had transformed into spectacles (see also Gatrell 
1996). Thus, Baldwin recommended replacing public hangings with more brutal forms of 
execution in order to reinstate the effect of deterrence. In his pamphlet, there is no notion of 
shame in expressing these brutal recommendations. His writings reveal an emotional state 
that lacks feelings such as pity or abhorrence in relation to capital punishment. 
To see underclass criminals as objects rather than as humans of equal standing was an 
unquestioned attitude. It was the habitus and the Weltanschauung of the gentry. These elite 
were domesticated in the sense of the theory of civilizing processes. They lived in fine 
manors, they cultivated an elegant lifestyle, they were well educated, and above all, they 
established a political system that resolved conflicts relatively peacefully (see: Elias 1960, 
18ff). 
However, the Machiavellian style of thinking about the poor involved a different aspect of 
their characters. It stood beside the relatively peaceful attitudes towards their own peers. The 
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Machiavellian code towards the lower classes lacks a sense of social responsibility. It reflects 
the high degree of commercialization in economic relationships that goes along with a lack of 
responsibility for the poor. This may be a product of the fact that feudal ties were dissolved 
earlier in England than in parts of Central Europe. 
Parliamentary debates about the death penalty reveal similarly distanced emotional patterns 
standing behind very loose social bonds between the peers and the lower classes. Here, too, it 
becomes clear that the English elites did not share an empathetic attitude in connection with 
the many executions. Romilly wrote in his diary: 
It is but a few nights ago, that, while I was standing at the bar of the House of 
Commons, a young man, the brother of a peer, whose name is not worth setting down, 
came up to me, and breathing in my face the nauseous fun of his undigested debauch, 
stammered out, “I am against your bill, I am for hanging all … There is no good 
done by mercy. They only get worse; I would hang them all up at once.” (in: 
Historical Sketch, 1835: 78f) 
 
Romilly, the great reformer, expressed a different emotional attitude towards the death 
penalty. He condemned the lack of mercy because he felt pity. Lord Ellenborough, argued 
differently in his speech at the House of Lords in 1811. He used a tone more refined, and 
even more Machiavellian. He disguised his lack of pity behind the pretense of defending the 
little man. This speech was made during a House of Lords debate on a bill to abolish the 
death penalty for all theft of private property with a value of less than 5 shillings. This bill 
had already been passed by the House of Commons but was rejected by the Upper House 
after Ellenborough‟s speech. 
 
My Lords, if we suffer this bill (as to stealing in shops) to pass, we shall not know 
where to stand, we shall not know whether we are on our heads or on our feet. If you 
repeal the Act which inflicts the penalty of death for stealing to the value of five 
shillings in a shop, you will be called upon next year to repeal a law, which 
prescribes the penalty of death for stealing five shillings in a dwelling-house, there 
being no person therein; a law, your lordships must know, on the severity of which, 
and the application of it, stands the security of every poor cottager who goes out to 
his daily labour. He, my lords, can leave no one behind to watch his little dwelling … 
My Lords, there are cases where mercy and humanity to the few would be injustice 
and cruelty to the many. There are cases where the law must be applied in all its 
terrors. My Lords, I think this, above all others, is a law on which so much of the 
security of mankind depends on execution, that I should deem myself neglectful of my 
duty to the public if I failed to let the law take its course. (in: Historical Sketch, 1835: 
80f) 
 
Lord Ellenborough gave the topic of abolishing the death penalty a certain “spin”, implying 
that abolishing capital punishment for these crimes is even crueler than executing a person. 
Both statements violate today‟s standards of political correctness, which would forbid one to 
speak openly (in the parliament) in such a way about killing people. They also reveal the lack 
of truly felt pity. Mercy may have played a role amongst some reform-orientated individuals 
like Samuel Romilly, however, like the majority of political elites, such feelings were less 
important. They were much too involved in the daily business of defending their economic 
base. Harsh laws against crimes of poverty were seen as proper measures. 
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6.2 Beccaria and paternalistic attitudes of administrative elites in the Habsburg Empire  
 
Let us revise Spierenburg‟s theme of “domesticated elites” by considering the Austrian case. 
Here, domesticated elites are identified with high-ranking civil servants and not with nobles 
or economic upper-classes. For this class of “indifferent middlemen” – usually civil servants 
– criminal cases were not of personal but professional interest. Their power increased with 
the rise of the administrative machinery. The peaceful working conditinos of these new elites 
fostered conditions for the development of a civilized habitus. Bureaucratic leadership helped 
to establish an “enlightened” regime of crime prevention and crime fighting. 
The example of Cesare Beccaria shows the close links between enlightenment and central 
government. Alongside his philosophical career, Beccaria was a civil servant in a very high 
administrative position in Habsburg Milan of the eighteenth century. Later, he became 
involved in reform programs for introducing a modern code of criminal law for the whole of 
Austria. 
“On Crimes and Punishment” became well-known amongst the political leaders of Europe as 
one of the most famous treatises against the death penalty. The book is more than a detached 
discussion about the best regime of punishment. It also features passages written in a highly 
emotional register against the death penalty and other forms of cruel punishments. It is not 
hard to detect Beccaria‟s disgust and abhorrence with capital punishment. In some passages 
Beccaria uses the technique of the internal monologue to demonstrate emotions and empathy 
with poor criminals. These imaginings were intended to evoke empathy amongst the readers 
of his treatise. 
 
“What are these laws which I have to obey, which leave such a gulf between me and 
the rich man? He denies me the penny I beg of him, brushing me off with the demand 
that I should work, something he knows nothing about. Who made these laws? Rich 
and powerful men, who have never condescended to visit the filthy hovels of the poor, 
who have never broken mouldy bread among the innocent cries of starving children 
and a wife‟s tears.  
[Here, Beccaria uses the rhetoric figure of an anaphora and depicts dramatic scenes of 
poverty to evoke empathy.] 
Let us break these ties, which are pernicious to most people and only useful to a few 
and idle tyrants; let us attack injustice at its source. [once again an anaphora] 
I shall return to my natural state of independence; for a while I shall live free and 
happy on the fruits of my courage and industry; perhaps the day for suffering and 
repentance will come, but it will be brief, and I shall have one day of pain for many 
years of pleasure…” (Beccaria [1764] 2000: 69) 
 
In another passage, Beccaria wrote about the abolition of the death penalty. He described 
establishing merciful laws in correlation to increasing the central government‟s power: 
 
How happy humanity would be if laws were being decreed for the first time, now what 
we see seated on the thrones of Europe benevolent monarchs, inspires of the virtue of 
peace, of the sciences, of the arts, fathers of their peoples, crowned citizens. Their 
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increased power serves the happiness of their subjects because it removes that 
crueler, because more capricious intermediary despotism, which choked the always 
sincere desires of the people which are always beneficial when they may approach 
the throne! If they leave the ancient laws in place, I say, it is because of the endless 
difficulty of removing the venerated and centuries-old rust. That is a reason for 
enlightened citizens to wish all the more fervently for their authorities to continue to 
increase.
 
(Beccaria [1764] 2000: 71f) 
 
Beccaria‟s “capricious intermediary despotism” resembles our type of weak state and its 
forms of domination. His opinion on the matter of capital punishment and the penal law is 
written from a bureaucratic elite perspective. The writings of Beccaria and other 
“enlightened” philosophers in the Habsburg monarchy were addressed directly against the 
local elites (“intermediary despotism”). They idealized a state bureaucracy run by a corps of 
civil servants that simply followed the written law (which itself is an expression of natural 
law) and that were not involved in local networks. These writers formed the ideological base 
for Josephian utopianism of the 1780‟s. Even earlier, the highest administrator of the 
Habsburg Empire, Graf Kaunitz, wrote a Letter to Graf Firmian, Governor of the Lombardy 
and direct supervisor of Beccaria. The letter was spurred by Empress Catherine‟s attempt to 
lure Beccaria to Russia. Kaunitz wrote: 
 
It would not be desirable for our country to lose a man, who is not only gifted with 
esprit but who is used to thinking freely. So much of his book [On Crimes and 
Punishment] enlightens! … Above all, it would do the ministry credit to honor this 
genius. We must be sooner than foreign states. (in: Wurzbach 1856: 202) [translation 
mine] 
 
This letter expresses more than goodwill toward Beccaria‟s ideas from the highest ranks of 
the imperial administration. It also reflects that enlightenment philosophers were treated by 
the royal courts of continental Europe like modern professional football players. It improved 
the reputation of an “enlightened” ruler to place thinkers like Beccaria among his or her staff. 
They reflected glory and legitimacy on the leader. This very idea of glory is only to be 
understood by imagining all absolutist nations of eighteenth century Europe as a network (or 
as a figuration) within which common symbols of honor and shame are shared by the ruling 
classes of these states. Unlike in England, the power centers of these states were transformed 
more and more into an administrative apparatus. Thus, it is no wonder that bureaucrats and 
rulers began to orientate to each other. They started a process of institutional isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). England lay clearly outside this figuration because her leading 
class differed from continental power-elites. 
  
The introduction of a new court system followed these ideals. First, judges became civil 
servants bonded to the code of impartiality. Second, an inquisition court-system was 
introduced (the older jury system was abolished). Third, the new penal code no longer 
contained torture or the death penalty. 
In the late eighteenth century, continental “enlightenment” also symbolized the lifestyle of 
civil servants who were no longer dependent on local aristocrats' interests. Civil servants 
lived and worked in salons, bureaus, agencies, universities and other environments in which 
direct economic involvement played no role. Their social fields, in the sense of Bourdieu 
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(Wacquant 1990), demanded professionalism and produced the habitus of distance, self-
control, routines, non-violent behavior and the belief in “healing” criminality. These social 
fields discouraged brutality (as a sort of unprofessional solution to their specific problems), 
rage and anger in relation to criminals. English upper-class thinkers surely also sought to 
introduce a rational or “enlightened” order. Lord Byron‟s statement, however, reveals not so 
much intellectual as emotional distance to both Beccaria‟s advice and his world of 
continental bureaucracy. Byron wrote 1816 from Milan: 
 
I have just heard an anecdote of Beccaria, who published such admirable things on the 
punishment of death. A soon as his book was out, his servant (having read it, I 
presume) stole his watch; and his master, while correcting the press of a second 
edition, did all he could to have him hanged by way of advertisement. (in: Historical 
Sketch, 1835: 77) 
 
Byron‟s statement reveals not only that he did not know the local laws – since the 1780‟s, 
stealing was no longer punished by death in the Habsburg Empire – but it also clearly 
indicates spitefulness toward somebody who seems to be a menace for the protection of 
property. 
 
In England, the reforms of the 1830s promoted an ideal of impartiality, too. However, these 
reforms were not promoted from “above” (by an enlightened regime) but rather from “below” 
(from the process of democratization). The English reforms went step by step with the 
incorporation of new bourgeois and craftsmen classes into the parliamentary system. Thus, in 
England as in Austria, the death penalty dramatically lost importance due to the process of 
bureaucratization. However, the two cases showed different patterns of bureaucratization. In 
Austria the bureaucratization and the abolition of the death penalty resulted from the state‟s 
struggle against local elites and patrimonial domination. In England, bureaucratization was a 
product of democratization. 
 
7. Conclusion and discussion  
 
Greenberg and West (2008) have recently focused on the role of democracy, civil rights, and 
religion in the abolition of the death penalty. This study argues that modern bureaucracy also 
plays a prominent role in facilitating a lenient regime of punishment. In the case of the 
Habsburg Empire, the administrative apparatus was mainly responsible for the decline and 
eventual abolition of capital punishment. Within the state bureaucracy, a “second civilizing 
process” was initiated. Thus, professional law enforcement specialists, bureaucrats, civil 
servants, and detached juridical staff formed a new class of “domesticated middlemen elites”. 
In strong states, this new class became a counterweight to other leading groups, especially 
older economic elites, whose power was based on immediate personal relationships. Out of 
this new class of bureaucrats a civilizing process was introduced which included the abolition 
of brutal punishments. On the one hand, the pure logic of bureaucratic routines blocks the 
involvement of spontaneous emotion while dealing with punishment and social control. On 
the other hand, peaceful living and working conditions engender disgust and abhorrence 
towards violence. 
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England of eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries combined capitalism, proto-democracy, 
and a weak state-bureaucracy. Here, the two fields of economic and political power were not 
yet divorced. They were still overlapping. Office-holders and economic elites (mostly 
landowners) were highly interrelated. This circumstance led to a situation in which elites 
claimed they had to rely on brutal punishments in order to fight crime. These elites feared the 
alternative: a strong state with a powerful police organization. The English case also 
demonstrates that in such liberal capitalistic oligarchies, only reforms in suffrage rights and 
further steps of “democratization” laid the foundation for introducing a more lenient penal 
system. Absolute monarchies did not have the same scruples when introducing authoritarian, 
non-locally based organizations in order to maintain social control. Here, it was in the interest 
of the centralized state to weaken local elites. 
Increasing the power of the state administration promoted a new habitus of leadership with an 
attitude against brutal punishments. Another component of this habitus was that private 
interests should not overlap with professional interests. Crime control became a professional 
field of work demanding objectivity and emotional distance. 
This paper has not examined wider international patterns of the death penalty and the state-
building process, but it has shown that in some respects, the English and the Dutch cases have 
similarities that indicate the important role of liberal capitalism, in which economic and 
political power overlap. However, it is much harder to understand, for example, the case of 
post-revolutionary France, where the death penalty played a more prominent role than in 
Austria. It would be also interesting to compare the Austrian case with that of other Empires 
consisting of many heterogeneous parts. Russia – where Empress Elisabeth abolished the 
death penalty in 1744 for all crimes, but Catharine II reintroduced it – would be an especially 
interesting case. 
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